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ABSTRACT
The Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) programme
of the Republic of Korea was formally launched in 1994.  The
limited success of the initial efforts and budgetary constraints
after the Asian financial crisis of 1997 prompted the Government
to take new initiatives in this area.  A new PPI law was adopted
in 1998, establishing the Private Infrastructure Investment Center
of Korea in 1999. The Center acts as a special arm of the
Government for the promotion of private sector participation in
infrastructure sectors.  These initiatives, along with other major
reforms in the economy, have helped the renewed PPI programme
to make tremendous progress.  By March 2003, 130 projects were
being implemented.  Contracts involving $ 13 billion of domestic
and foreign capital have been awarded.  Against this background,
this paper provides an overview of the Republic of Korea’s PPI
programme, its history, successes and failures, and unique
features.
INTRODUCTION
For the last few decades and especially during the 1970s and
1980s, the Republic of Korea achieved outstanding economic
development.  Provision of adequate infrastructure facilities was one of
the main policies of the Government to help the economy to grow and
the results were impressive.  In 1994, the Government launched a new
Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) programme to promote
private sector participation i  infrastructure development.  The PPI
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programme aimed at delivering infrastructure facilities by the private
sector in order to reduce the burden on the public budget as well as to
exploit the efficiency and creativity of the private sector.
The PPI programme of 1994, however, was not particularly
successful in attracting private participation in infrastructure sectors for
various reasons.  The financial crisis of the late 1990s compounded the
problem by imposing severe constraints on the Government in making
budgetary allocations to the infrastructure sectors.  Faced with this
situation, the Government took new initiatives to promote private
participation.  In 1999, a new PPI programme was launched through the
enactment of a PPI Act, which, inter alia, established a special unit, the
Private Infrastructure Investment Center of Korea (PICKO), charged with
promoting private participation.  Under the new law, various incentive
packages are offered to the private sector and rules and procedures for
project selection, evaluation and approval have been simplified.
These new initiatives along with other major reforms in the
economy have helped the new PPI programme to make tremendous
progress.  Troubled and delayed infrastructure projects under the
previous PPI regime were cancelled and efforts were redirected towards
facilitating the implementation of more promising projects.  By March
2003, 130 projects were being implemented.  Foreign investors have
invested, or are expected to invest, about $ 3.5 billion. Contracts
involving $ 13 billion of domestic and foreign capital have been
awarded.  Against this background, this paper provides an overview of
the Republic of Korea’s PPI programme, its history, successes and
failures, and unique features.  Finally, it makes some concluding remarks
about the future of the PPI programme in the country.
I.  POLICIES FOR INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
There have been many changes in infrastructure development
policies over the past four decades in the Republic of Korea.  In the
early 1960s, investment in the transport sector was made mainly in
railways with an emphasis on commercial lines. Between 1962 and
1966, investments in railway projects accounted for 64.2 per cent of the
total investment in the transport sector.  In addition to railways, large
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industrial ports were also constructed to handle imported materials.
However, the focus of investment in the transport sector shifted from
railways to roads with the massive construction of expressways that
began in the late 1960s.  The two major road construction projects were
the Gyeongin Expressway in 1968 and the Gyeongbu Expressway in
1970. Following these two major developments, many other
expressways as well as urban railways and container ports were built
throughout the 1970s.
The trend of transport infrastructure development in the 1970s
continued in the 1980s.  This was also a decade marked by massive
development of expressways and urban railways.  However, over the
years the Government had changed its policies for infrastructure
development and began to place greater emphasis on balanced regional
development.  This shift in emphasis led to lesser allocation of funds
for transport infrastructure facilities, resulting in heavy congestion
problems in the transport system, which in turn necessitated the
mobilization of additional resources for capacity expansion.
However, in the 1990s, many national-level prestigious
infrastructure projects were also launched, which included the
construction of the Gyeongbu High Speed Railway, Incheon International
Airport and Gadeok New Port.  Although private participation in
transport development began in the late 1960s, the introduction of a PPI
policy in 1994 provided the first stimulus for its growth in subsequent
years.  It was also during this period that the importance of transport
systems, including logistics and public transportation i major
metropolitan areas, began to be widely recognized.
II.  EVOLUTION OF PPI IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Private investment in transport infrastructure development has
been sought since 1968 to meet the growing need for capacity expansion
and improvement for which sufficient budget allocations were not
available.  As shown in table 1, by August 1994, 93 projects costing
US$ 2.7 billion were implemented with private investment.  As a
comprehensive l gal system supporting private investment in
infrastructure had not been established at this time, each project was
promoted under the laws governing each sector such as the Road Act,
Transport and Communications Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific No. 72, 2003
60
Harbour Act, etc.  These investments, however, were of limited size, did
not cover all sectors, and operation and management of these facilities
by the private party that invested in their construction were not
permitted.
Table 1.  Private investment in infrastructure, 1968-1994




Railroads 12  660
Harbours 52 1,232
Cargo terminals 4  378
Airports 16 256
Power plants 3 71
Total 93 2,703
Source: Kyubang Lee and Byung-rok Song, New Initiatives for Private Participation in
Infrastructure, (KRIHS, 1998), p. 27.
The PPI programme was launched in 1994 with the adoption of
the Promotion of Private Capital in Social Overhead Capital Investment
Act.  The Act aimed at facilitating PPI through the formulation of
consistent government policies across all sectors and the
institutionalization of clearly defined procedures to be followed for the
involvement of the private sector in infrastructure development and its
operation and management.  Under the provisions of this Act, the central
Government and various local governments in the country announced
the launching of a total of 100 private infrastructure projects, 45 by the
central Government and the remaining 55 by various local governments.
However, success in the first four years was far less than what
was expected.  Out of the 45 projects of the central Government,
concessionaires were designated for only 10 projects and construction
started on just 5 projects.  Very little progress could be made with the
rest of the projects of the central Government.  However, the progress
of the projects announced by local governments was much better, as can
be seen from table 2.  An important feature of all of these projects was
that only domestic capital was invested.
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As indicated in table 2, the ambitious PPI programme did not
result in successful completion of the majority of the projects.  No
concessionaire could be designated for 44 projects out of the total
100 projects.  Insufficient incentive measures, lack of transparency,
complicated procedures, non-conformity with global standards and
unsatisfactory isk-sharing mechanisms were often cited as causes of
dismal performance of the programme.  The Asian financial crisis of
1997 worsened the situation further.  In 1998, the GDP growth rate hit
an unprecedented negative rate of 6.7 per cent, inflation rose to 7.5 per
cent and the interest rate reached 15.1 per cent.
The limited success of this initial effort led the Government to
introduce a new PPI law for the country, which could revive the
programme and address the concerns of private investors.  Accordingly,
the Act on Private Participation in Infrastructure was enacted in
December 1998. This measure was also taken in response to the
financial crisis. As tax revenues dropped significantly less resources
were available.  Furthermore, most of the budget was allocated to
industrial and financial restructuring and growing demands for
infrastructure development were ignored in an effort to revive the
economy.
A comparison of the main features of the old and new PPI
regimes is provided in table 3.  As can be seen from the table, the new
Table 2.  Private infrastructure investment, 1994-1998
(number of projects)
Projects Projects
under central under local Total
Government   governments
Construction complete – 6 6
Under construction 5 31 36
In preparation for construction 5 9 14
No concessionaire designated  35 9 44
Total number of projects 45 55 100
Source: Kyubang Lee, “Introduction t  PPI System and PICKO”, paper presented at the
Seminar in Commemoration of the Establishment of PICKO, (KRIHS, 1999), p. 30.
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regime provides for systematic government support, transparent bidding
requirements and more incentives for the private sector.  These incentives
include bonus evaluation points to the initial proposer of unsolicited
bids, minimum revenue guarantees, foreign exchange risk guarantees,
etc.  The amended PPI law also defines clear and simplified procedures
to be followed for both solicited and unsolicited projects.  It may be
mentioned here that the old PPI law did not have any provision for
unsolicited projects.
Table 3.  Major changes in the new PPI law
Previous law New PPI law




Feasibility study No requirement Mandatory
Fiscal support Fragmentary recognition Systematic support system:
– Recognition criteria for
unsolicited projects set
out in the decree
– Minimum revenue
guarantee
– Foreign exchange risk
guarantee
– Recognition of buyout
rights
Support agency – – Establishment of PICKO
and the Infrastructure
Investment Fund
Source: Jungkyu Lee, “Regulations of PPI Act”, paper presented at the Workshop on Private
Participation inI frastructure, (KRIHS, 2002).
About four years have passed since the new PPI programme was
launched.  It seems that the renewed efforts of the Government to
promote PPI in the Republic of Korea have been successful.  The results
to date are quite impressive.  So far, in the transport sector 37 projects
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have been promoted by the central Government and another 92 projects
by municipal governments.  A significant amount of foreign investment
has been attracted; contracts worth $ 300 million have been signed, and
contracts worth another $ 3.2 billion are expected to be signed soon.
Construction of most of the projects for which a concession agreement
has been signed has already started.
Contracts of over $ 13 billion with both domestic and foreign
capital have been awarded.  Of these, 15 transport projects of the central
Government with investments of $ 11.1 billion accounted for the lion’s
share of the total investment.  Local governments have signed concession
agreements for 63 projects of worth $ 2.1 billion.  Figure 1 shows the
subsectoral distribution of these projects in the transport sector.
Source: PICKO.
Figure 1.  Investment in contracts awarded projects by













Roads Harbours Rail and LRTs Logistics
Billions of dollars
In addition to the new projects, measures have been taken to
revive projects for which concessions were granted earlier under the old
PPI regime.  Concessionaires designated under the previous PPI law
were given a chance to renegotiate their concession agreements based
on the new PPI law in order to take advantage of more favourable
conditions now available.  Table 4 shows some examples.  In all five
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projects, either a new minimum revenue guarantee was provided or the
level of the previous guarantee was increased from 80 to 90 per cent.
The minimum revenue guarantee provision lowers the risk borne by the
concessionaire through a government guarantee of projected revenue.
Almost every project renegotiated under the new PPI law had a higher
internal rate of return (IRR) and some projects benefited from additional
government subsidies.
Table 4.  Comparison of conditions before and after renegotiation
IRR (real)
Revenue guarantee Government subsidy
(percentage) (millions of dollars)
Before After Before After Before After
Road A 8.89 9.7 80 90 – –
Road B 6.81 9.24 80 90 – 350
Port A 7.4 9.5 80 90 – 416
Tunnel A 7.17 9.71 – 90 – –
Tunnel B 8.06 9.05 – 90 – 26.8
Source: PICKO.
III.  PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT CENTER
PICKO is a public organization, established in April 1999 under
the PPI Act.  It is located within KRIHS, one of the most prestigious
government research institutes, which plays a key role in territorial
planning.  The establishment of PICKO was designed to meet the need
of both the Government and investors concerning PPI services.
PICKO’s efforts are directed at creating synergies between concerned
government agencies and potential investors through the facilitation of
PPI projects and by providing technical expertise to both the public and
private sectors.  Previously, government agencies suffered owing to lack
of expertise and absence of standards to apply in the evaluation and
negotiation of PPI projects.  These deficiencies in public sector capacity
caused confusion for investors, particularly foreign ones.
The main role of PICKO is to promote private investment in the
Republic of Korea’s infrastructure projects, evaluate the feasibility of
these projects and provide training and expert services to the government
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agencies and the private sector.  In the case of unsolicited projects, it is
the obligation of PICKO to review the initial proposal at the request of
the concerned authority.  This is required in order to maintain consistency
in project promotion, as unsolicited projects often have a tendency to be
implemented without proper study and review of their economic
feasibility and desirability.  Review of bidding documents, evaluation of
proposals and negotiation of concession agreements are also PICKO
responsibilities.  Table 5 summarizes the nature of the services PICKO
has provided and the number of times it has provided them.
Table 5.  Services provided and achievements of PICKO
(number of services provided)
Types of work 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
Review of instructions for proposals 7 7 9 7 30
Review of unsolicited proposals 5 23 19 22 69
Evaluation of proposals 1 2 8 7 18
Negotiation for or review of concession 3 32 23 25 83
agreements
Review of feasibility studies, project selection4 8 10 0 22
and others
Total 20 72 69 61 222
Source: PICKO, 2002 Annual Report, (KRIHS, 2003), p.  9.
Another important function of PICKO is to assist the Government
in formulating policies related to PPI.  This is carried out through various
research activities, as well as advisory services to the Government.
PICKO also serves as the gateway to the country’s PPI market for
foreign investors.  Since its establishment in 1999, PICKO has regularly
organized road shows in various financial centres of the world such as
New York, Tokyo, Paris, Sydney and Hong Kong, China.
IV.  THE CURRENT PPI PROGRAMME
Thirty-four types of projects are eligible under the PPI Act.
These are grouped under 10 broad categories of roads, railways,
harbours, culture and tourism, water resources, energy, environment,
distribution, airports and communications.  If a project falls into any of
these 10 categories, it can be evaluated as a PPI project.  The method of
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implementation must then be decided.  The procedure for processing
a solicited project has been simplified as shown in figure 2.  The process
has been modified to encourage competitive bidding for projects that
are financially attractive.  It also allows for negotiation of the terms of
the concession agreement.
The Ministry of Planning and Budget, the concerned authorities
and PICKO are involved in the selection of investment projects,
evaluation of proposals and negotiation of concession agreements.  The
concerned authority (for example, the Ministry of Construction and
Transportation in the case of transport projects) undertakes the initial
activities for project development.  The concerned authority is also
responsible for approval of the engineering plan and confirmation of
project completion.
The process for unsolicited project implementation is shown in
figure 3.  The procedure is similar to that for solicited projects but it
also allows proposals from third parties.  The private sector sponsor of
a project prepares the project proposal and requests PICKO to review it.
The project proposal is then evaluated by PICKO.  If approved, a public
notification of the proposal and its content is made and alternative
proposals for the project from third parties are invited.  A minimum of
60 days is allowed for submission of proposals by third parties.  The
proposals from third parties along with the initial proposal are evaluated
and a winning bidder is selected.  The initial proposer is given a bonus
in the evaluation up to a maximum of 10 per cent of the total evaluation
score.  The project structure is determined through negotiations with the
winning bidder.
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Source: PICKO, PPI Program and Investment Projects in Korea, ( RIHS, 2002).
  *  Detailed engineering design and plan for implementation.
Figure 2.  Process for solicited project implementation
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Projects over W 200 billion:
Ministry of Planning and
Budget
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Source: PICKO, PPI Program and Investment Projects in Korea, ( RIHS, 2002), p. 16.
Figure 3.  Process for unsolicited project implementation
Submission of project proposal
Request for proposal review
Review of proposal
Submission of opinion regarding
the proposal
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V.  INCENTIVES FOR PPI PROJECTS
The financial viability of PPI projects is of great concern to the
Government.  If a project is found not to be financially viable, then its
economic evaluation is reviewed to determine whether the investment is
justified in terms of its expected benefits to the economy as a whole.  If
a PPI project is not financially viable but found to be economically
viable, various options are considered for improving the project’s
financial rate of return.  The acceptable financial rate of return of
a project is determined by taking into account three main factors:
(a) The average cost of borrowing for infrastructure projects;
(b) The risk premium associated with the type and scale of the
project;
(c) The rate of return for similar projects in other countries
competing for investor funds.
The reference range for determining the rate of return for PPI
projects is 11 to 14 per cent.  The rate of return for a particular project
is determined through negotiations taking into account the type of project
and the level of risk.
Under the new PPI law, the Government can offer a wide range
of incentives and take various other measures in order to reduce the
risks and uncertainties that may be associated with a PPI project.  The
incentives are offered in a way that can significantly improve the
financial viability of projects and reduce their implementation risks to
make them attractive for the private sector.  These incentive measures
are discussed next.
Land acquisition
The acquisition of land could be a major source of risk to any
investor in greenfield infrastructure projects, particularly road and rail
projects.  In order to reduce the problems of land acquisition, the
Government has given priority to the use of public lands for
infrastructure projects.  If necessary, the Government on behalf of the
investor acquires the private land required for a project.  In situations
where the investor is required to negotiate with the owners for the
Transport and Communications Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific No. 72, 2003
70
purchase of land, the Government assists the investor through its use of
the right of eminent domain.
Revenue guarantee
Although it is the intention of the Government to identify
financially robust projects, it is possible that some of the projects could
have a level of risk that is unacceptable to the private sector.  Greenfield
projects often fall into this category.  For high-risk projects, the
Government can provide revenue guarantees.  Under the PPI Act, the
Government can guarantee up to 90 per cent of the projected revenues
for solicited projects and 80 per cent of the projected revenues for
unsolicited projects.  Where these guarantees are provided, the
Government also limits the maximum amount of revenues that the
project developer can retain.  However, this amount would be
a minimum of 110 per cent of the projected revenues for solicited
projects and a minimum of 120 per cent of the projected revenues for
unsolicited projects.
Tax incentives
PPI projects may also qualify for various tax incentives offered
by the Government.  These include:
(a) Exemption from registration tax on the acquisition of real
estate for all BOT projects;
(b) Application from a 0 per cent value added tax for
infrastructure facilities or construction of those facilities supplied to the
State or local governments as BTO and BOT projects;
(c) Reduction of or exemption from various appropriation
charges;
(d) Recognition of 8 per cent of the investment as a reserve to
be treated as an expense for the purpose of computing corporate taxes.
In addition, the project company may issue infrastructure bonds
with a tax rate on interest earned of only 15 per cent.
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Foreign exchange risk
Since the economic crisis of the late 1990s in East Asia, one of
the serious concerns in the minds of foreign investors in Asia relates to
foreign exchange risk.  The revenues generated from the services
provided by infrastructure projects are primarily in won.  Therefore, the
Government has undertaken initiatives to limit the investor’s risk from
foreign exchange fluctuations.  Where foreign exchange fluctuations
exceed 20 per cent, up to 50 per cent of losses due to such fluctuations
may be offset through modifications of tariff rates, government subsidies,
adjustment of the concession period or other provisions.
Force majeure
The PPI law provides for government buyout of a project in
cases of prolonged force majeure.  Government buyouts may also apply
in certain extraordinary circumstances as provided for in the concession
agreement.
Protection against reduction of tariffs or shortening of concession
period
Another incentive is protection from a reduction of tariffs or the
concession period if the project developer is able to reduce construction
costs below those estimated in the agreement.  However, this implies
that there would be no adjustment if construction costs exceed the
original estimate.
VI.  THE 10-YEAR PLAN FOR PPI
In 2001, the Government of the Republic of Korea formulated
the 10-year plan for PPI with the main objective of inducing greater
private sector participation in infrastructure projects through
maximization of the leverage effect of government incentives for PPI
projects.  The plan provides clear guidance to the private sector
concerning the infrastructure investment policy of the Government and
priority areas of investment.  The PPI plan includes a list of 179 selected
candidate projects for private investment over the plan period from 2002
to 2011 by considering their investment priority within each of the five
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sectors of infrastructure namely, roads, railways, ports, the environment
and other facilities.  By providing preliminary information on candidate
projects, the plan is intended to prevent interested parties from
duplicating their efforts in initial project development activities.  It would
also help to ensure conformity of the PPI projects with the overall
development plan for each of the sectors.
The following general principles were applied in the selection of
candidate projects incorporated in the plan.  First, economically feasible
projects were selected by considering their social costs and benefits.
Second, projects that were found profitable enough if promoted as
private investment projects were selected after considering their
individual feasibility.  The estimated rate of return on investment, level
of effective operation and level of subsidy required were the factors
used in determining the profitability of candidate projects.  Finally,
factors such as the likely concentration of regional development in the
future and growth of demand were to be considered.  Within the
framework of these general principles, the selection criteria for each
sector were established in accordance with the characteristics of the
individual sectors.
In the road sector, a total of 18 projects (total project cost:
W 18.87 trillion) were selected, consisting of 10 expressways, 4 bypass
roads and 4 local roads.  In the railway sector, a total of 15 projects
(total project cost:  W 13.30 trillion) were selected.  These consisted of
3 main line railways, 2 metropolitan railways, 3 urban railways and
15 light rail transit (LRT) projects.  In the port sector, 29 projects (project
cost:  W 7.0018 trillion) consisting of 23 trading ports, 2 fishing ports,
3 waterfront facilities and 1 combined passenger terminal facility were
selected.  In the environmental sector, a total of 39 projects (project
cost: W 3.9425 trillion) consisting of 51 sewage treatment plants,
11 incineration facilities, 17 sewage sludge treatment facilities, 8 landfill
gas plants, 1 food waste recycling facility and 1 refuse-derived fuel
facility were selected.  In the category of other facilities, a total of
20 projects (project cost: W 20.537 trillion) were selected.  These
projects consisted of 2 logistics projects, 13 energy and 5 tourism sector
projects.
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The total cost of the 179 selected private investment projects is
approximately W 63.2 trillion.  The net private investment is estimated
at W 46.7 trillion excluding government subsidies.  Of these, the total
project cost for transport facilities is about W 40 trillion and the net
private investment is estimated to be W 26.1 trillion.  The total project
cost for environmental, tourism and energy projects is estimated at
W 23.2 trillion with W 20.6 trillion as net private investment.  When the
energy projects are excluded, as the energy sector is expected to be
privatized, the net private investment in environmental nd tourism
projects is estimated at W 6.2 trillion.
Additionally, a review of the plan for revisions and improvement
is planned to be carried out every three years in order to respond
promptly to changes in the environment and conditions of the PPI
market.  In order to accomplish the long-term goals of the plan,
a comprehensive management system is needed to divide the roles of
government-financed projects and private investment projects and ensure
complementarity between the two types of projects.
By implementing the plan, adequate private investment is
expected to flow into the Republic of Korea’s infrastructure market.
This would enable the Government to allocate more funds from its
limited resources to expand infrastructure facilities in underdeveloped
areas of the country.  Implementation of PPI projects would increase the
effectiveness of resource allocation by reinforcing the principle of “he
who benefits, pays” as the PPI facility users are directly responsible for
paying.  Within a 10-year period, the Republic of Korea is expected to
take the lead in the market of private investment infrastructure projects.
VII.  RECENT TRENDS IN THE PPI MARKET
The number of unsolicited projects has been growing since 1999.
There were 5 projects in 1999, 23 in 2000, 19 in 2001 and 19 projects
in 2002 (as at August).  Over these four years, while the road sector has
maintained its dominance, the number of environmental projects has
soared.  In the beginning, most of the unsolicited projects were small
ones with a relatively low investment priority, but the trend has changed.
The size of unsolicited projects is growing larger and now they rank
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high in the Government’s investment priorities.  One example is the
Seoul to Bundang railway project at a cost exceeding $ 1.6 billion.
This railway will link the capital city to Bundang, which is one of
Seoul’s largest satellite cities.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The economy of the Republic of Korea has recovered from the
Asian crisis of the late 1990s with a wide range of government-initiated
reforms, including more transparent and accountable corporate
governance, the breakup of the old government-backed chaebol
conglomerate system and a major clean-up of the financial and banking
sectors.  Growth of GDP was strong in the years immediately following
the crisis, and growth for this year and the next are projected to be at or
above the long-term projection of 6 per cent per annum.  The rate of
inflation has remained under control, interest rates are low and
decreasing steadily and the currency exchange rate has been stable.  With
these sound economic indicators, no sudden downturn is expected in the
economy in the foreseeable future.  However, continuing volatility in
global financial markets and uncertainties from the nuclear situation in
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea may cause instability in
domestic markets and harm the investment environment.
A growing economy creates massive demand for infrastructure
facilities.  The Republic of Korea continues to place high priority on
stable and sustainable development of the country, for which the
provision of high-quality and adequate infrastructure facilities is
essential.  It is estimated that over the next 10 years more than $ 150
billion of investment will be required to meet the growing needs for
new and improved infrastructure facilities in the country.  The PPI
programme of the Republic of Korea is envisaged to meet a large part
of this massive investment requirement and thereby to help lay a strong
foundation for the country’s bright future.
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